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House Bill 1131: An Enigma 
By Robert E. Powell, Esq. & Catherine A. Potthast, Esq. 
The 1988 General Assembly passed 
House Bill 1131, which will be subject to 
referendum in the November, 1988, gener-
al election. The overriding purpose of that 
legislation was to reduce the crime rate or 
incidence of violent crimes in the state 
through the prohibition of the manufac-
ture and sale of c.ertain handguns. It also 
had an avowed secondary purpose of over-
ruling the controversial decision of the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Kelley v. 
R. G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 
1143 (1985), by prohibiting the imposition 
of strict liability for damages caused by the 
criminal use of handguns. 
While the Act repeals the vague and 
potentially unconstitutional decision of 
the court of appeals and does provide a 
more reasonable method for the control of 
firearms manufaCtured and sold in this 
state, it is doubtful that it will have a far 
reaching effect on either the crime rate or 
the incidence of violent crimes. 
Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc. - Judicial 
Precursor of House Bill 1131 
In Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 
124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that a manufac-
turer or marketer of a "Saturday Night 
Special" handgun could be held strictly 
liable to persons who suffered gunshot 
injuries from the criminal use of the hand-
gun. The Kelley court was unable to clearly 
define a "Saturday Night Special" hand-
gun, and held that the determination was 
to be made on case-by-case basis by a jury 
considering 
the gun's barrel length, concealability, 
cost, quality of materials, quality of 
manufacture, accuracy, reliability, 
whether it has been banned from 
import by the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms, and other 
related characteristics. Additionally, 
the industry standards, and the 
understanding among law enforce-
ment personnel, legislators and the 
public, at the time the weapon was 
manufactured and! or marketed by a 
particular defendant, must be con-
sidered. 
Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. 
The Kelley decision represented a novel 
and unprecedented departure from estab-
lished principles of product liability law. 
Nearly every court considering this issue 
had held, prior to the Kelley decision, that 
a manufacturer of a properly functioning 
handgun could not be held liable when a 
third party intentionally used the gun in 
the commission of criminal acts. E.g., 
Perkins v. F.1E. Corporation. 762 F .2d 1250 
(5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington and 
Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 
1984); Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 
F. Supp. 1206 (D. Tex. 1985); DeRosa v. 
Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762 
(E.D. N.Y. 1981); Bennet v. The Cincinnati 
Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. 
Ky. 1973); Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So.2d 
98 (Fla. App. 1986); Rhodes v. R. G. Indus· 
tries, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 51,325 S.E.2d 465 
(1984); Riordan v. International Armament 
Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 
1293 (1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 
299 Or. 551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985). These 
courts recognized that strict liability is pre-
dicated upon the existence of a defect in a 
product which causes injury to a plaintiff. 
Regardless of the standard used to deter-
mine the existence of a defect, the courts 
agreed that a functional handgun is not 
defective solely by reason of the fact that 
it may present a danger. 
The Kelley court recognized that its 
decision was not compatible with tradi-
tional principles of product liability law, 
but nonetheless chose to fashion a new 
cause of action against manufacturers of 
"Saturday Night Specials" based upon its 
perception of the public policy of the state. 
See Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 
1159. 1 
The Kelley decision has been criticized 
by courts and commentators throughout 
the country. E.g., Shipman v. Jennings Fire· 
arms, 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Moore v. R.G. Industries, 789 F.2d 1326 
(9th Cir. 1986); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 
656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987); Brady v. 
Hinckley, No. 82-0549 (D.D.C. 1986), 
appeal pending, 815 F.2d 724 (D.c. Cir. 
1987); Trespalacios v. Valor Corporation of 
Florida, 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1986); 
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751 
(Mo. App. 1988); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry 
and Loan. Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 748 
P.2d 661 (1988). Robertson v. Grogan 
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Investment Co., 710 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 
App. 1986). One serious flaw in the Kelley 
decision concerns the lack of any meaning-
ful standard as to what constitutes a 
"Saturday Night Special." Without such a 
standard, handgun manufacturers, distrib-
utors, and users are simply unable to deter-
mine what products, if used by criminals, 
will subject them to liability. The "cri-
teria" of "barrel length, concealability, 
cost, quality of materials, quality of 
manufacture, accuracy, reliability ... and 
other related characteristics" are so vague 
as to constitute no standard at all. The 
Kelley decision fails to provide the type of 
adequate criteria and standards required to 
give manufacturers and consumers the 
notice requisite to due process. 
Moreover, the inadequate criteria and 
standards provided impermissibly dele-
gated basic policy matters to judges and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc subjec-
tive basis. "A statute is unconstitutionally 
vague if it either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must guess as to its 
meaning and differ as to its application." 
Lemberos v. Laurel Racecourse, Inc., 489 F. 
Supp. 1376, 1388 (D. Md. 1980). Although 
the constitutional requirement of 
definiteness primarily arises in a criminal 
context, the application of the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is not limited to such 
a context, and can invalidate a civil "rule 
or standard" as well as a statute. See gener· 
ally Small Company v. American Sugar 
Refining Co., 267 U.s. 233 (1925); Ciaccio 
v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.s. 399 (1966). The 
Kelley decision does not permit a person of 
ordinary intelligence to ascertain with any 
degree of precision which handguns are 
prohibited, except in the extremes. 
A second criticism of the Kelley decision 
is its potential discriminatory effect. Inso-
far as the Kelley opinion seeks to outlaw 
handguns on the basis of cost to the con-
sumer, the opinion raises other questions. 
First, the elimination of low cost guns 
from the market may deprive a poor per-
son of his ability to defend himself. 
Second, because of the lower labor and 
material costs in other countries, the Kelley 
opinion may have the net effect of discrim-
inating against alien manufacturers and 
providing preferential treatment to 
domestic manufacturers. Moreover, the 
decision draws an irrational distinction 
between victims shot with expensive guns 
and those persons shot with low cost guns. 
The cffect of the decision would be 
to impose liability on some manufac-
turers, while not imposing liability on 
others even though the handguns 
manufactured or sold by all may be 
used for criminal purposes. In short, it 
would seem to be better for a potential 
victim to be shot or injured by [a] 
cheap gun, than by an expensive one 
because in the case of the former, the 
victim could sue the manufacturer 
who no doubt would have a deeper 
pocket. 
Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549 (D.D.C. 
1986), appeal pending, 815 F.2d 724 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
Some critics further suggest that the 
Kelley decision is inconsistent with federal 
law and subject to federal preemption. The 
sale and distribution of firearms is heavily 
regulated on both the federal and state 
levels. E.g., 18 U.S.c. 921-929 (1976). Sec-
tion 907 of the Federal Firearms Act 
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to 
prescribe rules and regulations pertaining 
to the transport of firearms in Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce. The Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) 
promulgated detailed regulations pursuant 
to this mandate. See 26 C.F.R. Parts 177-
178. These regulations have the effect of 
placing manufacturers on notice as to the 
nature of the weapons which may be 
approved, and provide a means by which 
a license and approval can be obtained. 
UThe criteria. .. are 
so vague as to 
constitute no 
standard at all." 
The federal regulatory scheme is thus a 
uniform mechanism by which weapons 
manufacturers and sellers may market the 
product. The need for uniformity of regu-
lation is obvious when dealing with inter-
state and foreign commerce Manufacturers 
and importers need to know what 
weapons may be marketed. 
The BA TF regulations provide this uni-
formity and, indeed, provide a specific rul-
ing on each and every model of gun. This 
federal regulation thus delicately balances 
the competing values of safety, commerce, 
the right to bear arms, and uniformity in 
laws. The doctrine of preemption pre-
cludes the States from upsetting this deli-
cate balance established by federal law. 
Federal law can preempt state law in three 
ways. First, when enacting a federal sta-
tute, Congress may expressly state an 
intent to preempt state law. E.g., Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
Second, even absent express preemptive 
language, Congress may otherwise indicate 
its intention to preempt state law by legis-
lating so comprehensively that it has "left 
no room for the states to supplement fed-
eral law." E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Finally, 
even absent an express or implied intent 
by Congress to preempt state law, state 
law is preempted if the state law "stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Kelley decision 
potentially stands as an obstacle to the fed-
eral scheme of importation and commerce, 
because it requires jurors, on a case-by-case 
basis, to make the determination of which 
handguns are marketable and which are 
not. Nothing in Kelley prohibits two juries 
from making inconsistent proclamations 
on the same model gun. The rule set forth 
in Kelley is thus arguably preempted by 
federal law. 
HOUSE BILL 1131: Kelley's Aftermath 
House Bill 1131 was enacted in response 
to the Kelley decision. Although the Bill 
attempts to correct some of the deficien-
cies in the Kelley opinion, questions as to 
its net effect remain unanswered. Moreo-
ver, it is unlikely that the bill will have the 
effect of reducing the incidence of violent 
cnme. 
The bill's preamble articulates the Gen-
eral Assembly's finding that "certain hand-
guns have no legitimate socially useful 
purpose and are not suitable for law 
enforcement, self-protection, or sporting 
activities," and sets forth its intention to 
"remove these handguns from the streets 
of this state." To that end, the bill estab-
lishes a "Handgun Roster Board," consist-
ing of nine members appointed by the 
Governor. The Board members are to 
include the Superintendent of the 
Maryland State Police, and representatives 
of the Association of Chiefs of Police, the 
Maryland State's Attorneys' Association, 
handgun manufacturers, the Maryland 
Chapter of The National Rifle Association 
Marylanders against Handgun Abuse, and 
three citizen members. The Board is charg-
ed with the responsibility of compiling a 
handgun roster of permitted handguns 
that are "useful for legitimate sporting, 
self-protection, or law enforecement pur-
poses." 
The bill requires the Board, in compiling 
the roster, to consider the following char-
acteristics: "concealability, ballistic 
accuracy, weight, quality of materials, 
quality of manufacture, reliability as to 
safety, caliber, detectability by security 
equipment, and utility for legitimate sport-
ing activities, self-protection, or law 
enforcement." These factors are no less 
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vague, and are, nearly identical to the "c~i­
teria" adopted by the Court of ~ppeals I~ 
the Kelley decision. The sole difference IS 
that the criteria of "low cost" has been 
eliminated from the factors to be con-
sidered by the Board. Cost may, however, 
enter into the question inadvertendy by 
virtue of consideration of the quality of 
materials and manufacture. 
The procedure for gaining app~oval of 
handguns is specified by the bIll, and 
allows a person to petition for a specified 
handgun inclusion on the approv~d rost~r. 
A petitioner whose handgun IS dented 
placement on the list may request a. he~­
ing, and may appeal an adverse rullO~ ~n 
accordance with the Maryland Admlnts-
trative Procedure Act. Rulemaking 
authority to carry out the provisions C?f 
the act is granted to the Secretary of PublIc 
Safety and Correctional Services. 
The Act overrules the Kelley decision 
which imposed civil tort strict liability 
upon a handgun manufacturer ~or the 
criminal use of a handgun by a thIrd per- . 
son and instead, substitutes criminal 
pen'alties for manufacturing, dist~ibuting, 
or selling handguns that are not lOcluded 
on the approved roster. The maxim~m 
fine under the Act is $10,000 for each VIO-
lation. Each handgun sold, manufactured 
or distributed is considered a seperate vio-
lation. In addition, the bill enables the 
Superintendent of the Maryland State 
Police to obtain a temporary or permanent 
injuction precluding the manufacture or 
sale of handguns not included on the han~­
gun roster. Surprisingly, there is no specI-
fic prohibition in the Act on the use of 
non-approved handguns.2 
Bill 1131 thus attempts to correct some 
of the deficiences in the Kelley decision. By 
establishing a handgun roster in advance of 
marketing and sale, it attempts to add the 
elements of certainty and notice lacking in 
the Kelley decision. No longer will juries 
make an ad hoc and subjective determina-
tion of approved handguns, an approach 
which can only lead to inconsistent results. 
The ad hoc and subjective application of 
the . Kelley criteria is instead delegated to 
the Board. The fact that one rule making 
body has been substituted may lead to 
more consistency, provided the Board 
does not act in an arbitrary fashion. The 
manner in which the Board interprets and 
applies the prescribed factors will deter-
mine whether the General Assembly has 
successfully overcome the flaws inherent 
in the Kelley decision. 
There still remain many unanswered 
questions concerning the effect of the Act, 
and whether the roster or regulations 
under the Act are preempted by Federal 
law. Much depends upon the manner in 
which the Board applies the factors desig-
nated in the bill to specific handguns. 
Questions to be addressed in evaluaing the 
roster and the regulations to be pro-
mulgated under the Act are whether there 
is consistency between similar handguns ~f 
different manufacturers, whether there IS 
any pattern of approval in favor of 
domestic manufacturers,3 and the extent to 
which the Roster is consistent with, or 
contrary to the regulations promulgated 
by the BATF. 
The rulemaking power granted pursuant 
to the Act potentially can clarify the vague 
"criteria" set forth in the Act, and perhaps 
preclude a successful "void-for-vagueness" 
challenge to the Act. The Secre!ary shoul? 
adopt comprehensive .re~latlons s~e~l­
fically defining the cnterIa for balhstlc 
accuracy, permissive weight, caliber ~d 
the parameters for the quality of materIals 
and manufacture. It is suggested that, to 
avoid challenges to the Act on preemption 
grounds any such regulations adopted fol-
low the ~pplicable BA TF regulations. Such 
an approach would preclude inconsistency 
between state and federal regulation and 
would ease the burden on the free flow of 
interstate commerce. 
It is interesting that in all of the argu-
ments presented in favor of this bill by the 
Office of the Attorney General and 
various police organizations, no reference 
has been made to any definitive studies 
which support a theory that inexpensive, 
poorly made and inaccurate handguns are 
preferred by criminals. To the contrary, 
recognized criminologists have demon-
strated that the majority of guns used in 
the commission of crimes, especially street 
crimes, are stolen and are of good quality. 
E.g., Wright and Rossi, Armed and Con· 
sidered Dangerous (1985); Brill, The Traffic 
(Legal and Illegal) in Guns, Harper's, Sept. 
1977 at 37-44. In fact, while it is far from 
definitive, a cursory review of recent news-
paper releases, where reference is made to 
the weapon, reveals that good quality 
weapons are preferred. 
Both the Kelley decision and House Bill 
"the majority of guns 
used in. .. crimes 
are stolen and are of 
good quality." 
1131 seek to remove from the streets 
"Saturday Night Specials." Aside from the 
fact that there is no true definition of a 
"Saturday Night Special," neither 
addresses the real issue which is the misuse 
of firearms. Banning the manufacture or 
sale of handguns, regardless of the descrip-
tion, only places a prohibition upon manu-
facturers and merchants. It does not pre-
clude the importation of handguns, nor 
does it impose any penalties on the theft o.f 
guns. All that this bill does is to theoretI-
cally reduce the number of gun.s a~ailable 
on the legitimate market. WhIle Its lan-
guage may be sufficient to encompass the 
black market, there certainly is no practi-
cal means of policing such activity. 
In actuality, House Bill 1131 simply pre-
cludes the marketing of defective or unreli-
able handguns. The regulations of the 
Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms already prescribe specific criteria 
for accomplishing that end. Most of the 
criteria suggested by the bill are addressed 
to functionability, quality of manufacture, 
and safety of the user. While concealability 
and detectability are referred to, those 
characteristics become superfluous when 
considerations of self-protection and law 
enforcement are injected into the equa-
tion. 
In summary, although the Act does 
attempt to remedy the gross deficiencies ~n 
the Kelley opinion, it is unlikely to fulfIll 
its primary purpose. 
FOOTNOTES 
I Kelley never addressed whether the hand-
gun at issue was a "Saturday Night Spe-
cial" under its articulation. In fact, the gun 
at issue was a 38 Special, similar in size and 
caliber to a police revolver. 
2 Other Maryland statutes, however, pro-
vide criminal penalties for weapon related 
crimes. E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 36E 
(1) (1987); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 36G 
(b) (1987); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 488 
(1987); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §445 (c) 
(1987). 
3 The bill specifies that the Board member 
representative of the gun manufacturing 
industry be "preferably a manufacturer 
from the State." 
Robert E- Powell is a partner in the Balti-
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Catherine A. Potthast is an associate with 
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